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Why does the adherence to norms not prevent conflict? While the current literature focuses 
on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to cooperation, the issue 
of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general game theoretical 
model of “normative conflict” and explain how transaction failures on the macrolevel can 
result from cooperative motives on the microlevel. We differentiate between two kinds of 
conflict. The first results from distinct expectations regarding the way in which general 
normative obligations should be fulfilled, the second from distinct expectations as to how 
the norm should restrain actions based on self-interest. We demonstrate the empirical 
relevance of normative conflict in a version of the ultimatum game. Our data reveal wide-
spread normative conflict among different types of actors – egoistic, equity, equality and 
cherry picker. Our findings demonstrate how cooperative intentions about how to divide 
a collectively produced good may fail to produce cooperative outcomes.
Why is it that people consider our behavior improper despite our best intentions? 
Should norm adherence not prevent us from running into conflict? For example, why 
is it that well-intentioned, expensive presents are often rejected? For what reason is the 
offer of a seat on a bus angrily rejected by a sprightly elderly person? How to explain that 
getting “straight to the point” in a business meeting is often perceived as unmannerly?
These everyday occurrences are puzzling given that norms of behavior are generally 
regarded as cohesive. Even scholars of opposing schools of thought seem to converge 
around the idea that social norms emerge because they have positive consequences 
for society. In the functionalist approach, norms bridge the tension between indi-
vidual self-interest and the functional prerequisites of society (Durkheim 1997[1897]; 
Parsons 1937; Dahrendorf 1958). The rational choice literature studies conditions 
under which individuals will overcome their self-interest in order to contribute to 
cooperation norms in society (Taylor 1976; Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Bicchieri 1990; 
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Coleman 1990; Voss 2001). Interestingly, the emphasis of the arguments in both tradi-
tions is on the positive societal effects of social norms: “The view that norms are created 
to prevent negative externalities, or to promote positive ones, is virtually canonical in 
the rational choice literature.”(Hechter and Opp 2001:xvi)
In our view, however, social norms do not only promote cohesion, they can also under-
mine it. In this article, we develop a theory of normative conflict that analyzes the condi-
tions under which social norms are likely to create transaction failures. The main problem 
here is not to overcome self-interest but to agree on the norm that should be followed. It 
is remarkable how little attention has been devoted to normative conflict, although there 
are numerous examples of persistent, severe and harmful cases of normative conflict, all of 
which are relevant to sociology of science, organizations and economics.
For example, while most academic disciplines agree on what makes a “good” pub-
lication, two norms coexist in sociology: publishing in books and publishing in peer-
reviewed journals (Clemens et al. 1995). Publications have an enormous influence 
when it comes to reputation, grant acquisitions or getting a job. Especially in mixed 
genre departments, however, finding the right metric of merit may lead to conflicts 
and prolonged faculty meetings due to conflicting opinions.
Similarly, multiple norms for signaling and receiving credit for authorship coexist 
between and within different academic fields (Hudson 1996; Tscharntke et al. 2007), 
e.g., alphabetic ordering, bracketing (with the main contributor as the first author 
and the supervisor at the end), ordering based on merit (in a decreasing order based 
on relative contributions), or even multiple first authors (with a footnote identifying 
all authors who contributed equally to the work). If norms clash and authors cannot 
agree, fruitful collaborations may not occur and manuscripts may remain unpublished.
These examples demonstrate the disintegrative character of social norms, providing the 
underlying intuition of our theory of normative conflict. The novelty of our contribution is 
threefold: First, we analyze how norms, each of which may be perfectly fine, may cause prob-
lems if they conflict. Second, we show how experimental data can be used to classify people 
according to their norms. In particular, we introduce a new experimental design yielding 
fine-grained measures of different normative types in the population and develop statistical 
methods for extracting and disentangling these types. Third, we identify two elements of 
norms, i.e., content (the basic rule to follow) and commitment (the balance between self-
interest and norm), and investigate which of them is more responsible for conflicts.
Our analysis further contributes to the discussion of the micro-macro links in 
sociology (Raub et al. 2011) by providing an in-depth understanding of the emergence 
of normative conflict from cooperative intentions. This is done by developing a game 
theoretical model of conflicting distribution norms for which we assume heteroge-
neous populations regarding actors’ normative expectations. Here, normative conflict 
is understood as transaction failure resulting from different expectations.
A Perspective of Normative Conflict
To specify the concept of normative conflict, we can distinguish two elements that 
constitute the structure of social norms. We define a social norm as a commonly 
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held expectation of how an actor ought to behave, which is enforced by sanctions 
in case of violations.1 Within a social norm, two elements specify the factors that 
generate behavioral expectations: the kind of action that should be done, on the 
one hand, and the intensity of the action, on the other. We term the first element 
normative content, which may be defined as the kind of behavior that is prescribed 
or proscribed in a given situation. It provides information about which of the 
situation’s characteristics should be evaluated when choosing an action. We term 
the second element level of normative commitment, indicating that social norms 
usually require an actor to restrict self-interest in favor of another person’s or 
group’s well-being. Consequently, we define this element as the extent to which an 
actor should sacrifice self-interest to comply with the norm. The level of norma-
tive commitment is not fixed. While some norms may require strong restrictions, 
others are less demanding.
The level of normative commitment and the normative content are triggered by 
normative cues. These serve as context-specific signals, specifying which of the many 
possible norms should be applied and to what extent. However, there are sometimes 
many and ambiguous cues. Hence, choosing the right cues is important.
Paradoxically, actors may adhere to social norms, believe they behave correctly and, 
nevertheless, experience conflict. Consequently, we can define normative conflict as the 
transaction failure resulting from actors holding partially(at least) exclusive normative 
expectations. The distinction between content and commitment of a norm enables us 
to classify two different types of normative conflict.
The first source of normative conflict could be that each of a number of actors 
regards a different commitment as appropriate. It may also be that people share a norm 
but some of them act, to some extent, as free riders. A robust finding states that the 
gradual decline of cooperation is driven by the fact that there are some people who 
do not want to contribute their fair share, even if they accept the need to provide the 
good (Yamagishi 1986; Ostrom et al. 1992). Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) study 
this dynamic, showing that only minor undercutting leads conditional cooperators to 
reduce their efforts. Thus, few shirkers can lead to a global emergence of conflict on 
the macro-level.
The second source of normative conflict may be the adherence to different norma-
tive contents. For example, when it comes to performance-related salaries, blue-collar 
employees consider harmful working conditions as an important determinant, while 
white-collar employees stress value creation (Hyman and Brough 1975). In another 
study, soldiers differed in whether military merits or the fact that someone was married 
and had children should be considered important for an early demobilization after 
World War II (Stouffer 1949). Thus, attributes of working conditions, family status 
or having children may serve as cues which determine the allocation of scarce goods 
(such as money or demobilization).
Conflict may also emerge if some people do not accept certain cues recognized as 
valid by other groups. Think of a group of employees in a firm calling for equal pay in 
contrast to a second group demanding a payment scheme based solely on added value.
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Bargaining Norms as an Exemplification of Normative Conflict
We further elaborate our concept of normative conflict by exemplifying it in the 
framework of distributive justice norms.
In these contexts, social norms can be thought of as a function mapping individu-
als’ characteristics to expected outcomes. However, it is often not clear (1. which of 
these characteristics serve as a valid cue, (2. whether there is consensus about the 
 validity of the respective characteristics, and (3. what is the implied degree of norma-
tive commitment.
Conditional and Unconditional Bargaining Norms
The greatest emphasis in the literature has been placed on identifying which individual 
characteristics are considered valid in a certain context. In a seminal work, Eckhoff 
(1974) identifies fundamental norms, or rules, that can be roughly distinguished as 
to whether they do or do not take individual characteristics, such as a person’s needs, 
efforts or status, into account.
Some norms, equality norms, can be considered unconditional as they do not rely on 
individual characteristics and treat people as equal (Jasso and Opp 1997). The demand 
for these norms often increases when harmony in a group is paramount (Leventhal 
et al. 1980) and when people interact over a long period of time. As long as the persons 
involved are not too different with respect to need, status or investments in a project, 
equality norms are the method of choice. Equality norms are cognitively undemand-
ing, exemplified by the fact that young children often apply them, while older children 
are capable of using more sophisticated rules.
Other norms allocate resources conditional on individual characteristics. They pre-
scribe, for example, allocations as a function of status or the centrality in networks.2 
Wages are often influenced by these rules such as seniority-based salaries (Stainback 
et al. 2010). The status of the owner can also affect the perceived value of a good. At 
auctions, golf clubs owned by John F. Kennedy sell for much higher prices than “ordi-
nary” golf clubs (Thye 2000; Thye et al. 2005). Under different circumstances, need has 
been found to be the only valid criterion; nevertheless, efforts and merits are relevant 
in other contexts. The allocation of organs for transplant is an important application 
of this norm (Elster 1989). There is a lively debate about who should receive an organ 
if demand exceeds supply. Should the chances of survival, the time on the waiting list, 
or the responsibility for taking care of own children count as valid cues? The acceptance 
of cues also depends on the selector’s characteristics (Ubel et al. 2001), and the need 
may be perceived as more important among close friends rather than strangers (Lamm 
and Schwinger 1980).
Among the conditional norms, the merit-based equity norm is the most relevant for 
our study. Equity norms assert that the individual input is the only valid criterion in 
determining output. Those who invest more effort will be compensated more gener-
ously (Homans 1961; Blau 1964; Adams 1965; Cook and Emerson 1978). By effort 
we understand individual contributions in terms of time, endeavor, energy or other 
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valuable individual resources to achieve a goal. Adams’ (1965) classical definition of 
equity refers to the equivalence of the quotient of outcome and effort (Oi /Ei = Oj/Ej) 
for all involved actors i,j. As Harris (1976) points out, this formulation of equity is 
rather simple, but it captures the relevant point.
Normative Conflict Over Commitments
In many situations, there may be a general agreement that allocations should be 
made on the ground of individual efforts. But there is disagreement about to what 
extent this cue should bind the decision maker. If two persons agree that an equality 
norm should be applied, they may still run into conflict if one of them tries to take 
advantage and claims a bigger share (see Figure 1a). The same kind of conflict may 
emerge if both agree on an equity norm, but one of them discounts the other person’s 
effort and offers a smaller share. The conflict over commitments arises over balancing 
the norm with individual self-interest, and it may be present even if all actors agree 
on the same norm.
Normative Conflict Over Contents
In the framework of bargaining norms, equity and equality norms can solve a coopera-
tion problem. Moreover, both norms have the same implications if effort is equal: out-
comes should be split equally. But if inputs are different, both norms imply different 
allocations (see Figure 1c). A low contributor claiming equal shares would not agree on 
getting only his input share. However, someone with an equity norm who contributed 
larger amounts would not agree on handing over more than the other’s input share. In 
this case, cooperative intentions are not enough to reach a cooperative solution. Thus, 
a population has to coordinate on one principle to avoid conflict. Normative conflict 
over contents results from the balancing between two distinct and at least partially 
exclusive norms. This kind of conflict may exist even if all actors fully comply with 
their respective norms in the absence of any self-interested reasoning.
Derivation of Hypotheses on Normative Conflict
A General Model of Normative Behavior and Its Application to the Ultimatum Game
We derive the existence of normative conflict from a simple and tractable model that 
has become prominent in the experimental literature on social norms. We prove two 
propositions, namely that (1. normative agreement is always possible if subjects agree 
on the same normative cue, and that (2. conflict may be unavoidable if there is dis-
agreement about the underlying cue. To sketch the proof of proposition 2, think of 
someone who made a major contribution to a common project and believes he or she 
should be compensated accordingly. The less willing he is to accept an equal split, the 
stronger his commitment to the equity principle. The interaction may result in conflict 
if his interaction partner contributed only a little but strongly claims an equal alloca-
tion. We prove the existence of a threshold as a function of individual contributions 
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and the commitment to the norm. Conflict is likely to emerge if the differences in 
contributions go beyond this threshold.
To investigate these questions, we apply general theories of normative behavior and 
analyze conditions under which alternative norms are in conflict with each other. Unlike 
other models of normative behavior,3 Christina Bicchieri’s (2006) model is flexible with 
respect to normative content, allowing for analysis of conflict between normative contents.4
The workhorse of our theoretical as well as experimental investigation of normative 
conflict is a variant of the ultimatum game experiment (Güth et al. 1982). This classical 
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game is regarded as a parsimonious measure for distributive justice and fairness norms: 
a proposer and a responder bargain over a given amount of money π, called the pie. 
The proposer offers a share of the pie to the responder. If the responder accepts the 
offer, he or she receives the share and the proposer may keep the rest of the pie. If the 
responder rejects the offer, the pie is lost and nobody receives anything.
Empirical results indicate that the ultimatum game meets the three criteria of social 
norms stated above. Responders have normative expectations about the proposer’s 
behavior so that low offers are frequently rejected. This may be regarded as costly 
punishment of norm violations. Proposers anticipate such potential sanctions and form 
respective beliefs. These beliefs trigger behavioral regularities such that offers below 20 
percent of the pie are rare, and close-to-equal splits are the most frequent outcome 
(Roth 1995). This matches our definition of social norms that there is: (1. a commonly 
known behavioral expectation (2. among the responder and the proposer, (3. which is 
enforced by sanctions in case of norm violations (here: rejection of the offer).
The conflict resulting from different norms can only emerge when there is room 
for at least two reasonable social norms. We therefore extend the ultimatum game 
by introducing an additional task; production of the pie. Thus, the proposer and the 
responder may build claims with respect to their efforts.
For the simplicity of the argument, assume that the utility of player i ∈ [p = proposer, 
r = responder] of a share of the pie x ∈ [0,π] can be evaluated as a function of the material 
outcome x, the content Ni of his/her norm, and the commitment ki ≥ 0 to that norm.5 
The general formulation of normative behavior allows us to include different normative 
contents Ni for the proposer and the responder, facilitating the analysis of normative 
conflict. Norm Ni denotes the amount a player thinks he or she should receive under his/
her norm. To define the content of Ni, we utilize two well-established distinct streams 
of research in behavioral economics and sociology. Probably the most cited formulation 
of an equality norm is the model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). It implicitly 
attributes egalitarian norms to the subject’s utility function which regards
 N = nequality
1
× pi  (1)
as the normative solution (which reduces to 50:50 in the case of n = 2 players).
However, other players may have internalized the equity norm instead.6 In this case, 
a player takes the relative effort into account when evaluating the material outcome in 
the light of his or her normative expectation. The previously introduced equity norm 
is thus given by the respective relative effort
 N e
effor
effort
equity i
j=1
n
j
= = ti
∑
× pi.  (2)
For the following discussion we normalize the size of the pie to 1 such that we can 
denote the proposer’s effort by ep and the responder’s effort by 1 – ep.
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Furthermore, players can be committed to “their” norm to a different extent. The 
model assumes for the normative commitment ki ≥ 0. If ki is equal to zero, norms do 
not play a role, while for players with large ki social norms have profound behavioral 
implications. For the following analysis we assume common knowledge of the players’ 
efforts, their norms Ni, and their normative commitments ki.7
In case the responder rejects, both players’ utility is given by
U Up reject r reject, ,= = 0.
If the responder accepts an offer x,
 U x,N ,k = x k max N xp,accept p p p p( ) 1 [ (1 ),0]− − − −  (3)
is the proposer’s utility, and
 U x,N ,k = x k max N x,r,accept r r r r( ) [ 0]− −  (4)
is the responder’s utility.
However, in the case of full commitment (ki  → ∞), utility is reduced and becomes 
negative for even smallest deviations from the “normative share.” Players do not discount 
their utility, however, if they receive more than expected, which is implied by the maximum 
of equations 3 and 4.8 Consequently, a responder accepts an offer x if his or her related 
utility is at least zero, otherwise she rejects. Given the common knowledge of the norms 
and the normative commitment pursued by each player, a rational proposer would make 
an offer that maximizes her utility but keeps the utility of the responder non-negative.
If the responder is not committed to any norm so that kr = 0, the utility of x is 
simply given by U(x) = x. Then, the acceptance threshold is given by standard game 
theory with t*= 0. The proposer anticipates this and will therefore offer zero. If kr is 
positive, the responder’s utility of x decreases if she receives less than what she expected.
If we plug the equality norm (1) and the equity norm (2) into the utility functions 
(equations 3 and 4), four cases can occur: both players share the equity norm, they 
share the equality norm, the proposer holds the equity and the responder the equality 
norm, or the proposer holds the equality and the responder the equity norm. In case 
the proposer holds the equity norm, Equation 3 becomes
U x,N ,k = x k max e x ,p,accept p p p p( ) 1 [ (1 ),0]− − − −
while for the responder who holds an equity norm, Equation 4 becomes
U x,N ,k x k max e x,r,accept r r r r( ) = [ 0].− −
For the case of an equality norm, the proposer’s utility is given by
U x,N ,k x k max xp,accept p p p( ) = 1 [1 2 (1 ),0],− − − −/
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and the responder’s utility is given by
U x,N ,k x - k max xr,accept r r r( ) = [1 2 ,0]./ −
Solving the responder’s utility function U x,N ,kr,accept r r( ) = 0  with respect to x returns 
the responder’s acceptance threshold
 t =
k N
k .
* r r
r1 +
 (5)
If x < t*, the utility of acceptance is smaller than the utility of rejection so that the 
responder will reject even positive amounts.
Application of the Model to Study Normative Conflict
We can now investigate the macro-level results of interacting players. The first two cases 
prove that, given the restriction of complete information, normative conflict does not 
emerge if players share the same norm.
Proposition 1
If proposers and responders share the same norm, that is, if Np = Nr =1/2 or if 
Np= ep and Nr = (1– ep), and if the normative adherence (as given by Np, Nr, Np, 
Nr) is common knowledge, there is no normative conflict, i.e., there exists an offer 
x ≥ t*, which will be presented by the proposer and accepted by the responder for 
all kp and kr.
Proof (See Online Appendix A.1)
On the other hand, proposers and responders may adhere to different norms, which 
can cause normative conflict. Intuitively speaking, an equity proposer with a high level 
of effort will not agree to offer the equal split to an equality responder because he or she 
has contributed too little. Conversely, an equality proposer who has contributed only 
a little will not agree to offer only his or her effort level. Figure 2 is meant to illustrate 
the argument in an intuitive way.
Normative conflict between holders of different norms occurs if the differences 
in efforts are too extreme. What “too extreme” means depends on the normative 
commitment of the two players. We therefore have to evaluate the model in 3 and 4 
from the other side: as we already know the acceptance threshold for the responder, 
we are interested to see for which differences in efforts the proposer’s utility of an 
accepted offer is still positive. Plugging the acceptance threshold of the responder 
into the utility function of the proposer and solving this equation with respect to 
the proposer’s effort, ep yields the critical threshold θ of relative effort. If an equity 
proposer contributed more than the threshold (ep > U) or an equality proposer less 
than the threshold (ep > U), both parties receive a higher utility from a rejected rather 
than an accepted offer.
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Proposition 2
Let θ be the critical threshold of the proposer’s relative effort given by
 
θ =
k k k
k + k k if N = e N = ,
k and k > (k
p r p
r p r
r p p
p r
p
− −
−
−
2
2 2 >
1
2 (1 ),
1
2
> 1, 2 1) ,
k k + k + k +
k + k k < if N = ,N = e ,
k > and k > (k
p r p r
p p r
r p p
p r
p
2 2
2 2
1
2
1
2
1, 2
− 1
1
) ,
otherwise .




  
(6)
or if Np= and
Figure 2.  Illustration of Normative Conflict Due to Different Normative Contents
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Note: The θ denotes the threshold of relative effort beyond which conflict is inevitable for 
holders of different norms and sufficiently high normative commitments. In (a), the normative 
conflict between an equality proposer and an equity responder occurs if the responder 
contributed more effort than the critical threshold θ. In this case, a decreasing commitment to 
the equity norm reduces the responder’s claims, though not as much as the proposer would 
be willing to offer. In (b), the situation is reversed. The proposer holds an equity norm while the 
responder holds an equality norm. Conflict is inevitable, if the responder contributed less than 
the critical value θ but has an acceptance threshold of almost 50%.
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If Np = ep, Nr  = 1/2, and ep > U, rejection is a subgame perfect equilibrium for certain 
values of kp and kr. If Np = 1/2, Nr = (1– ep), and (1– ep) > U, rejection is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium for certain values of kp and kr.
Proof (See Online Appendix A.2)
In summary it can be said that normative conflict as a result of different normative 
contents emerges if the differences in efforts are above a specific threshold. This thresh-
old is given as a function of the different norms subjects adhere to and the respective 
commitment to their norms. On the other hand, even people adhering to different 
norms are able to avoid conflict if they are sufficiently tolerant or do not differ too 
much from each other with respect to their norm-relevant criteria such as effort.
Hypotheses
Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that normative conflict does not occur if proposer 
and responder adhere to the same norm and have common knowledge about their 
normative types. This holds for all effort levels and normative commitments. If pro-
poser and responder hold different norms, however, normative conflict is inevitable 
if their differences regarding efforts and normative commitments are too large. The 
conclusion from both theoretical analyses, both with common knowledge and with-
out, is the following:
Hypothesis 1: There is more normative conflict over contents than 
over commitments.
We can derive a second hypothesis from our formal analysis of normative conflict. 
In the ultimatum game with efforts, normative conflict over contents means that play-
ers regard effort as either important or unimportant for their normative evaluation. 
Therefore, if two players do not differ in their effort levels, normative conflict does not 
arise. In contrast, if the differences in their effort levels are large, the likelihood of conflict 
is high. This conjecture is illustrated in Figure 2, leading us to conclude the following:
Hypothesis 2: The larger the differences between the efforts of proposer 
and responder, the higher the probability of normative conflict.
Method
The Ultimatum Game
In order to test our theory, we conducted a variation of the ultimatum game experi-
ment Güth et al. (1982). This experiment is one of the most parsimonious methods 
for measuring normative behavior. A high offer is usually regarded as adherence to a 
fairness norm and the rejection as a punishment for violating the norm.
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Real Effort Task
Our first variation of the ultimatum game introduced a real effort task by requiring 
subjects to invest their own time prior to the experiment. Thus, each subject could 
decide to invest spare time in order to earn more money later on. Five days before the 
experiment, subjects received a seven-page text of a Wikipedia entry on Westminster 
Palace by email.9 An accompanying letter informed subjects that prior reading of the 
text would influence earnings in the experiment. We chose a rather specific topic to 
ensure that everyone had to learn the text and nobody could benefit from his or her 
respective field of study (such as mathematics or paleontology). At the beginning of 
the laboratory experiment, subjects had to answer 20 questions about Westminster 
Palace with five answer categories each. For each correct answer, subjects earned 1 Euro. 
Thus, the maximum earning was 20 Euro. In the ultimatum bargaining part, the joint 
earnings of two randomly drawn players were pooled to form the pie. This procedure 
was designed to induce a feeling of personal effort and inherent monetary earnings.10
Strategy Vector Method
Our second variation of the ultimatum game introduced an enhanced method for mea-
suring normative behavior on an individual level, called the strategy vector method (Selten 
1967; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Falk and Fischbacher 2002). A “conventional” ultimatum 
game using efforts asks a proposer to offer the responder a certain amount of money. The 
responder can accept or reject this offer while both players know each other’s particular 
effort levels. This method only allows us to test offers and their acceptance for two particular 
effort levels. In contrast, our implementation of the strategy vector method allows us to 
measure the offer and the acceptance for every possible combination of effort levels. For 
example, from the pool of subjects, two subjects, i and j, were matched by the computer.13 
Player i was informed that he or she earned 10 Euro in the quiz but was not told about 
player j’s effort or role in the experiment. Instead, we asked subject I about all decisions for 
every possible effort level in both roles. In a first step, he was asked in the role of proposer 
how much he offered if responder j contributed 0 Euro, 1 Euro, 2 Euro, . . ., 19 Euro, 20 
Euro. In a second step, the roles were reversed, and player i was asked about the minimal 
offer she was willing to accept if her proposer, j, contributed 0 Euro, 1 Euro, 2 Euro, . . ., 19 
Euro, 20 Euro, which we refer to as the “acceptance threshold.” Player i and player j simi-
larly entered 21 decisions as proposers and 21 decisions as responders. In a third step, the 
computer determined the joint pie size of players i and j. Suppose that player i contributed 
10 and player j 15 euros to the pie. The computer then compared whether the proposer’s 
offer for the responder’s effort of 15 was at least as high as the responder’s acceptance 
threshold for a proposer’s effort of 10. The money was paid out, if the offer was as high as, 
or higher than, the responder’s acceptance threshold, otherwise the money was lost.
Procedure and Participants
The experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher 
(2007). At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 
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computer terminals. General instructions regarding the procedure were given on paper. 
Subjects were informed about the knowledge quiz, and it was once again pointed out 
that reading the text would have considerable influence on earnings. After completing 
the quiz subjects received instructions for the ultimatum game. Next, they had to 
respond to test questions regarding the rules of the game up to three times, to verify 
that they understood the rules. The experiment started when there were no further 
questions. Communication was prohibited from that point onward. After completing 
the ultimatum game, subjects were paid at their seats.
The participants were 92 undergraduate students of the Universität Leipzig from a 
wide range of academic disciplines. Forty-seven subjects were male and 45 female. The 
experiment was conducted in two separate computerized laboratories. Proposers and 
responders were located in separate rooms.
Measures
The content of a player’s norm is measured by the degree to which the relative offer 
determines his or her decision. We discuss the classification for proposers, but clas-
sifying responders follows the same criteria. The strategy method elicits every offer for 
every relation of effort levels between proposer and responder. These response profiles 
allow us to estimate for each proposer an individual linear function of how his or 
her relative effort determines each respective offer. This function can be expressed by 
an individual regression model for each proposer, specifying the relative effort as the 
explanatory and the offer as the outcome variable. The regression yields two param-
eters, intercept and slope, whose values are used to classify proposers into those who 
adhere to the content of the equality or equity norm and those who do not adhere to 
social norms but to selfish reasoning. More specifically, we can measure:
Content of equity norm: The offer/acceptance function of an equity player is charac-
terized by a steep slope regarding how effort determines offers and acceptance thresh-
olds, respectively.
Content of equality norm: The offer/acceptance function of an equality player is char-
acterized by a flat slope regarding how effort determines offers and acceptance thresholds, 
respectively. The intercept is relatively high and close to the equal share of 50 percent.
No norm adherence: Egoistic players are characterized by a flat slope and a low intercept.
Normative conflict: Our measure of conflict is the rejection of an offer. We measure 
norm-related conflict over contents by the rejection of an offer made by a responder of 
a different normative type. In contrast, a rejection of an offer among similar normative 
types represents norm-related conflict over commitments. See Figure 3.
Results
Macro-level Conditions for Normative Conflict
For the measurement of normative conflict in the case of ultimatum games with efforts, 
four conditions have to be met so that a profound empirical analysis of normative 
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conflict becomes feasible. We examine the empirical validity of these conditions by 
employing multilevel models. These quantify the impact of effort on the proposer’s 
offer and the responder’s acceptance threshold and, more importantly, on the vari-
ance in the subjects’ level of normative commitment in their consideration of effort. 
Multilevel modeling takes into account that the 21 decisions per subject are not inde-
pendent of each other. The multilevel models applied in our analysis estimate the 
average effect of effort on the individual level (fixed effect). Further, they estimate the 
standard deviation of the effect of effort across individuals in the population (random 
effects). Moreover, multilevel models estimate the average intercept and the standard 
deviation of this intercept across individuals in the population.11
The first condition for measuring normative conflict requires that subjects have to 
perceive the ultimatum game as a norm-relevant situation. Thus, almost every subject 
has to believe that almost every other subject has a “normative” expectation and not a 
selfish one. A selfish expectation would correspond to the game theoretical concept of 
subgame perfect equilibria, and players with “normative” expectations offer consider-
able amounts and reject low offers.12
Result 1: On average, proposers offer considerable amounts of money and low offers are 
frequently rejected.
The empirical results of Table 1 confirm the first condition: subjects understand the 
game as a norm-relevant situation. There is significant empirical evidence that most 
players are guided by social norms rather than by playing the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium of offering and accepting 0. The intercept of the proposer shows that 
even when the responder contributes nothing, proposers offer 33 percent of the pie, 
on average. Furthermore, the responders’ positive intercept of 31 percent in the fixed 
effects part of the model reveals that responders are punishing norm violations at their 
own cost, supporting that responders perceive the ultimatum game as norm relevant.
Figure 3.  Classification of Proposer and Responder Type (Left) and Type of Conflict (Right)
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Note: Subjects Subjects are assigned to types according to specific thresholds. The respective 
thresholds for slope,intercept, and slope are determined using a kernel density estimation.
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The second condition requires that effort have a significant impact on subjects’ fairness 
decisions. This is in contrast to typical ultimatum game experiments, in which endow-
ments are supposed to compensate the efforts of subjects, i.e., the time spent in the lab 
(for an overview, see Güth 1995). In these scenarios, effort is usually the same for all 
subjects, so that the straightforward allocation norm is to split the pie equally. In contrast, 
our method of generating different efforts to obtain the endowment introduces effort as 
an additional normative cue. This triggers the behavioral expectation of an equity norm. 
Thus, at least for some subjects, effort should have a significant impact on the fairness 
decisions in the ultimatum game, which establishes a precondition for normative conflict.
Result 2: The higher the responders’ effort, the higher their least accepted offer, and the 
higher the proposers’ offer.
Result 2 supports the second condition. A substantial fraction of subjects regard 
the criterion of effort as norm relevant. In addition to the proposers’ and responders’ 
intercepts, the relative contribution to the common pool significantly affects both, the 
offer and the acceptance threshold: if a responder contributed the full pie, she receives 
a 29 percent higher offer and has a 15 percent higher acceptance threshold than if the 
proposer contributed the full pie. The empirical relevance of effort, therefore, provides 
the precondition for heterogeneity in normative expectations.
Proposer's Relative 
Offer 
Responder's 
Relative Threshold 
Fixed effects 
N=1931 decisions 
***13.***33.tpecretnI
)520.()120.(
Responder's relative effort  .29*** .15*** 
)730.()140.(
Random effects 
J = 92 subjects 
Standard deviation intercepts  .20*** .24*** 
)810.()510.(
Standard deviation responder's efforts  .39*** .35*** 
)720.()030.(
Correlation (responder's efforts/intercepts) -.84*** -.60*** 
)560.-()090.-(
4.5927.8742doohilekiL-goL
13911391snoitavresbO
Table 1: Linear Multi-level Models for the Impact of the Responder’s Efforts on the
Proposer’s Offers and Responder’s Relative Acceptance Thresholds
Note: Effort, offers and acceptance thresholds are normalized. This normalization expresses
the efforts of responders relative to the efforts of proposers (scaling from 0-1). Further, the
offers and acceptance thresholds are expressed in relation to the pie sizes (scaling from 0-1).
Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05     **p < .01     p*** < .001
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A third macro-level condition is that subjects have to differ in their evaluation 
of effort as a norm-relevant criterion. In more formal terms, the normative con-
flict over contents requires heterogeneity of the population in their adherence to 
different normative contents. In our context, some subjects have to adhere to the 
equity norm and others to the equality norm. This heterogeneity can be measured 
if some subjects evaluate effort as important for their offer and acceptance decisions 
(the “equity players”), while others do not consider it as important (the “equality 
players”).
Result 3: The population is heterogeneous in terms of the effects of subjects’ efforts on offers 
and acceptance thresholds.
Result 3 is supported by the large and significant standard deviation of the respond-
er’s effort in the random effects part of Table 1.
Fourth, normative conflict over commitments requires that some actors believe 
the norm should strongly restrict the pursuit of self-interest, while others believe in 
mild restrictions. We suspect that different levels of normative commitment occur 
in situations in which actors have opposing interests. Such asymmetric situations are 
given if an actor who is worse off claims that he or she ought to be compensated by 
someone who is better off. The ultimatum game is an ideal representation of such 
asymmetric situations. Equity players with a low commitment can be understood as 
players who do not fully compensate the opponent’s effort. Equality players with a low 
commitment can be understood as players who do not claim the full equal split but 
are satisfied with less.
Result 4: The population is heterogeneous in the subjects’ reaction to low effort levels.
Result 4 is supported by the large and significant standard deviation of the intercept 
in the random effects part of Table 1. Based on results 3 and 4, we infer the existence 
of three distinct types of normative behavior in our population: equality players with 
high intercepts and low slopes, equity players with an inversed pattern of low intercepts 
and high slopes, and egoistic players with low intercepts and low slopes. While the first 
two types can be explained by normative behavior, egoistic players do not adhere to a 
norm but rather to the game theoretical standard solution of the game. Moreover, the 
strong negative correlations between intercepts and slopes suggest that equality and 
equity players are more frequent than egoistic players.
Figure 4 illustrates the proposers’ offers and responders’ acceptance thresholds for 
given responders’ efforts. In the top figure, it can be seen that most offers cluster around 
lines corresponding to equity and equality norms. There are also a few “hyper-fair” offers. 
Further, a large portion of offers are located between the equity line and the equality 
line or even below both lines. Thus, some proposers are biased by self- interest. Although 
some proposers increase their prospective share by making moderately low offers, few of 
them play the subgame perfect equilibrium solution and offer the minimum.
Among responders, there are surprisingly many who adhere to the equality norm 
and are willing to punish offers below 50 percent with rejection. This is an unusual 
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Figure 4.  Proposer’s Relative Offers as a Function of Responder’s Relative Effort (a) 
and Responder’s Relative Acceptance Thresholds as a Function of the Responder’s 
Relative Effort (b)
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finding, as many previous studies report that offers of 40 percent and above are almost 
always accepted. In contrast to results for proposers, the “attraction” to pure equity 
and equality norms is not as pronounced for responders. As a result, the variance in 
the responders’ decisions is much higher. Further, the histogram on the left shows that 
20 percent of the acceptance thresholds are below 20 percent. The respective players 
are willing to accept very low offers, sometimes even if they contributed much more 
than their proposers.
The Micro-level Roots of Normative Conflict
How can we understand the structures on the macro level by micro-level behavior? 
Figure 5 depicts four typical proposer profiles and Figure 6, four typical responder pro-
files. Player 2 represents a pure equality player. In the role of proposer and of responder, 
player 2 offers and claims always 50 percent, regardless of the differences in effort between 
proposer and responder. Meanwhile, player 3 shows pure equity, always offering exactly 
as much as the responder’s effort and always demanding at least his or her effort as a 
responder. A third type of player is one who plays the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
Player 13 constantly offers and accepts the smallest possible positive amount of 50 cents. 
Consequently, we call this player type the egoist. We even found another type, showing 
an intriguing hybrid behavior between self-interest and norm compliance. This fourth 
type plays according to the equity norm as long as he is a relatively high achiever but 
switches to the equality norm if he is a relatively low achiever. Note player 20 as proposer 
and player 36 as responder of this type. We call these players cherry pickers as they seem 
to adhere to norms but “pick” the norm which serves their self-interest best.
In order to classify the subjects into normative types, players are categorized accord-
ing to their reactions to the responders’ efforts. We classified the player’s proposer and 
responder behavior separately, looking at the offers (and acceptance thresholds) in the 
role of proposers (and responders). The abstract idea of classifying individuals into nor-
mative types is implemented by using OLS regressions which take effort as a predictor 
for individual offers and acceptance thresholds. We made sure that the algorithm is not 
biased by imposing the normative types on the empirical data. In contrast, subjects were 
assigned to types in a purely data-driven way. More specifically, our approach classifies the 
individual strategies according to (the respective intercepts and slopes of returned from 
individual regressions). We categorized players with a low slope and a high intercept as 
equality, with a low slope and a low intercept as egoist, with a high slope as equity, and 
with a quadratic slope as cherry picker. (See the online appendix for a discussion of our 
classification algorithm.)
The insets in figures 5 and 6 describe the resulting distribution of different proposer 
and responder types. More than half of the proposers adhere to equality norms and 
about 40 percent to equity norms, while cherry pickers and egoistic proposers are 
the exception (3% each). Subjects are more risk averse if they are in the role of the 
responder. While 48 percent adhere to the equality norm, the fraction of equity players 
is only 25 percent, and the fraction of egoistic responders, 20 percent. The proportion 
of cherry pickers is small (3%).
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Aggregation of Norm Adherence on the Micro-level to Normative Conflict on the 
Macro Level
Subjects who are either equity or equality types in the role of proposer or responder 
predominant in our data.13 This means that any given proposer/responder can be 
described by his or her norm (equity or equality) and his respective commitment to 
that norm. We take all possible interactions into account and not just those pairs who 
were actually matched in the experiment. This procedure does not bias our results 
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because each subject had to respond as proposer and responder before they were 
actually assigned to a role and matched with their opponent, so no learning effects 
could occur.14 Thus, we can base our estimation on 4,830 interactions because each 
of the n = 70 subjects can be matched as proposer with each of the other subjects as 
responder, resulting in n(n – 1)/2 = 2,415 interactions. Conversely, each subject can be 
matched as responder, resulting in an additional 2,415 interactions. As this procedure 
implies that each subject made several decisions that are not independent, we correct 
for inflated standard errors by clustering for subjects. Comparable analyses taking only 
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the actually realized matches in the experiment into account yielded similar results but 
with larger standard errors.
Result 5: There is more normative conflict over normative contents than over normative 
commitments.
To support Result 5, we simulated the interactions of each proposer with each 
responder using our empirical data. Figure 7 describes the relative frequencies of 
the different forms of normative conflict. In confirmation of Hypothesis 1, our 
concept of conflict over contents is the more prevalent source of conflict. From 
2,263 interactions among holders of different normative contents, 39 percent (885 
cases) end in rejection, while in only 32 percent (822 out of 2,567) of the interac-
tions, conflict emerges among holders of different levels of normative commitments. 
A logit model confirms the general results from Figure 7, estimating significantly 
higher probabilities of conflict if actors do not share the same normative content 
(robust standard errors, z = 5.14, p < .001).15 The percentage of content-related 
conflict is even higher if only equality proposers are considered (44% or 426 out 
of 959 interactions), whereas the relative frequency of conflict due to commitment 
between equality proposer and equality responder is significantly lower (31% or 605 
out of 1,939 interactions result in conflict, z = 3.82, p < .001). However, the picture 
is slightly different for equity proposers. Here, it does not make a difference whether 
the responder shares the norm or not. Conflict arises in 217 out of 628 interactions 
(35%) when the responder shares the proposer’s norm, just as in the case when the 
responder adheres to the equality principle (36% or 459 out of 1,304 observations, 
Figure 7.  Frequency of Conflict in a Situation Where Proposer and Responder Adhere 
to Different Normative Contents or Commitments
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z = .18, p = .861). Overall, the data supports our claim that conflict due to different 
normative contents is an important notion to understand the interrelation between 
social norms, cooperation and conflict. The insignificance of the last result, however, 
somewhat challenges our general theoretical claim but may well be a result of the 
strategy method, which is sometimes criticized for its hypothetical character.
Finally, we confirm effort as the underlying source of normative conflict as stated 
in Hypothesis 2. The differences between the proposer’s and responder’s effort spark 
off the conflict over alternative norms, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Result 6: The larger the differences between the proposer’s and responder’s efforts, the higher 
the probability of normative conflict, indicated by higher rejection rates.
Result 6 is supported by Figure 8 and the corresponding logistic regression model. 
Note that the data refers to all potential interactions between all players in each role. The 
regression calculates the probability of conflict as a function of the difference in relative 
effort between proposer and responder. Our findings confirm Hypothesis 2 that normative 
conflict is significantly more likely for unequal effort levels. The probability plot reveals 
that 25 percent of the subjects end up in conflict if their efforts are similar, while 55 per-
cent do so when one party contributed almost everything and the other almost nothing.
Figure 8.  Logistic Regression Quantifying the Impact of Differential Effort on Conflict
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Note: The larger the differences in the relative effort contributed to the common pool, the 
higher the probability of conflict. The table on the left reports logit estimates and standard 
errors while the figure on the right displays the corresponding changes in the probability of 
conflict. The grey area represents the 95% confidence bounds for the logit coefficient 
“difference in relative effort.” Relative effort  is measured in percentages with the own 
contribution divided by the total contribution of the respective interaction between proposer i 
and responder j. We take absolute values of the differences in effort, i.e., , and therefore do 
not differentiate whether the proposer or the responder contributed more. The number of 
interactions is calculated by all possible interactions between each subject in the role of 
proposer and all other subjects in the role of responder. Clustering of subjects in these 
interactions is taken into account by calculating robust standard errors.
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Discussion
This article outlines a new theoretical perspective on social norms in which conflict 
is considered an inherent component of such norms. The heterogeneity of norms 
is a potential source of conflict, counteracting the capability of norms to promote 
cooperation. Our empirical confirmation is based on a strategy ultimatum game in 
which actors apply different norms of distributive justice if they differ in their effort 
in producing their joint pie.
A substantial fraction of our subjects holds an equality norm and demands an 
equal share of the pie irrespective of effort. Another substantial, but slightly smaller 
fraction holds an equity norm and demands the share that corresponds to their effort. 
We show the empirical relevance of normative conflict when both players decide to 
be cooperative and contribute a “fair” share to the common good but hold different 
norms of what they consider to be fair. We explain this disagreement by the adherence 
to different normative contents.
Furthermore, our evidence demonstrates another source of normative conflict. 
Our empirical data reveal that the adherence to similar norms is by no means suf-
ficient to achieve cooperation. In fact, people have to agree on the extent to which 
social norms should restrain their self-interests, i.e., they have to commit to a norm 
to a similar extent. Even though they might agree that, in principle, a specific norm 
should be followed, “undercutting” is regarded as legitimate by some while it is unac-
ceptable for others. Thus, different degrees of normative commitment form a second 
important source of normative conflict. Our experimental results show that conflict 
resulting from different normative contents is more prevalent than conflict resulting 
from  different normative commitments.
Our research can be related to the research on group dynamics. Friedkin and Johnsen 
(1999) propose a dynamic model of emerging consensus or persistent disagreement, in 
which the opinions of peers in a network can influence each other to a certain extent. 
Both, opinion dynamics and the content of social norms, can be regarded as a result 
of a bargaining process. However, there are also some important differences in the two 
approaches. For one, social norms often go along with material interests, while actors 
are usually assumed to have shared interests when it comes to opinion dynamics. 
Furthermore, while Friedkin and Johnsen chose a dynamic approach, our study can 
be regarded as a static investigation of the final stage of conflict. More research on the 
dynamic component of normative conflict could help to close this gap and promote a 
better understanding of the evolution of normative content.
In a more general context, the “cultural diversity” of social norms is remarkably 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the plurality of social norms can be enriching, refresh-
ing and help society to adjust to different situations and changing conditions. The 
recognition of alternatives to habits and behavioral standards we take for granted opens 
our eyes to the arbitrariness of certain norms and our often non-reflective tendency to 
follow traditional rules. This heterogeneity of normative behavior affects creativity and 
innovation in society, stimulating the increase of individual and public welfare. On the 
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other hand, cultural diversity may also endanger cooperation and social order even if 
all members of society adhere to normative expectations. The coexistence of distinct 
norms may generate conflict despite cooperative intentions, which may, in turn, lead to 
an evolutionary process in the emergence of normative content. The constant struggle 
in society for the power to define the validity of norms is often accompanied with 
hypocritical rhetoric to convince the disadvantaged to adhere to norms that promise 
great benefits. In view of the complexity of these social conflicts and cleavages, future 
research will need to address the relations between material interests, the internalization 
of norms and selfish behavior. Do actors with higher incomes tend to pursue equity 
norms, and do actors with more power promote norms that preserve existing power 
structures? We need laboratory studies to test the theoretical relations on the micro-
level and surveys to evaluate the social structure of normative conflict. We believe that 
our new perspective on normative conflict is a fruitful tool to uncover the double edge 
of social norms in promoting cooperation on one side but conflict on the other.
Notes
1. For a discussion of different definitions of social norms, see Opp (2001) and Elster (1989); 
for a current review on social norms, see Rauhut and Krumpal (2008); for literature on the 
punishment aspect, see Yamagishi (1986) and Heckathorn (1989); and for a microscopic 
foundation of coordination norms, see Helbing (1992) and also Young (1993).
2. Status value theory (Berger et al. 1972) defines fair compensations from the more abstract 
perspective of “what is just for someone with my status” rather than by comparing interacting 
agents. It thereby considers structural aspects of a situation or society which are somewhat 
disregarded in exchange theory. Status value theory aims at explaining why something is 
considered fair, while our study investigates people’s reactions toward unfairness. Of course, 
this has consequences for the concept of norms. While status value theory asks “what is 
normal,” we ask how one should be treated compared to an interaction partner.
 3. There are a number of models of normative (or fair) behavior, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Rabin (1993); Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004); Falk and Fischbacher (2006); Frohlich et al. (2004).
 4. The model is more complex in its general form and accounts for a variety of games. We 
refer to Chapter 1 of Bicchieri’s book for a more general discussion.
 5. The way we model utility has been disputed. For a discussion, see Binmore and Shaked 
(2010); Fehr and Schmidt (2010); Eckel and Gintis (2010).
 6. For a related formulation of a utility function, see Frohlich et al. (2004).
 7. Relaxing the assumption of common knowledge does not qualitatively change the results.
 8. To keep the model tractable, we exclude the case where subjects feel guilt about being 
better off than their norm prescribes. However, the qualitative results of the analysis do 
not change when allowing for guilt.
 9. Available at: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/PalaceofWestminster.
10. For example, Rauhut (2009) implemented a general knowledge quiz without the 
opportunity to prepare for it beforehand.
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11. Put more technically, consider the offers and acceptance thresholds as a function of the 
responder’s relative effort
y xij j j j ij= ( ) ( ) ,1 1 2 2 2β ζ β ζ ε+ + + +
 Where b1 is the population intercept, z1j and z2j are idiosyncratic error terms following the 
distribution z1j : N(0,C), xij is the relative effort of the responder, and « ij is an independent 
measurement error. The fixed-effects part estimates b1 and b2, the random effects part 
estimates C for z1j and z2j. For introductions to multilevel analysis, see Snijders and Bosker 
(1999) and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005).
12. For empirical literature on typical ultimatum game outcomes without the consideration 
of efforts, see Roth 1995; Cameron 1999; Hoffman et al. 1996; Oosterbeek et al. 2004; 
Güth et al. 2007.
13. The other types are too rare for an analysis of conflict: we identify 3 proposers and 3 
responders as cherry picker types, and 3 proposers and 18 responders as egoistic types.
14. We excluded one case as an influential outlier because this subject contributed zero to the 
pool and showed extreme behavior by offering everything as proposer and demanding 
everything as responder.
15. We checked the robustness of the result by applying a clustered logit model as well as a 
robust and a clustered probit model. They all returned qualitatively similar and statistically 
significant results.
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